Aim: The research effort in the aspect of a model of a court control of a decision issued by the President of the Office for Competition and Consumer Protection is predominantly supported by significance and importance of applicable legal solutions in practice. The research was aimed at evaluating the model of court control of decisions of the OCCP President.
Introduction
Cases concerning competition and consumer protection, despite their undoubted public law nature, have been subjected by the legislator to the review by common courts. When discussing the issue of court review of decisions issued by the President of the Office of Competition and Consumer Protection (President of UOKIK), it is worthwhile to assess the adopted model in the context of ensuring adequate exercising and protection of rights of entrepreneurs. Attempting to evaluate the model of judicial review of the decision of the President of UOKiK, it is necessary to limit the selected aspects. Hence, detailed issues concerning, inter alia, the legal status of the President of UOKIK, off the proceedings conducted by this administrative body or court proceedings serving to review certain executive powers exercised in competition and consumer protection matters, fall outside the scope of the present discussion. The aim of the considerations is to present the model of the court review of administrative decisions issued by the President of the Office of Competition and Consumer Protection and attempt to evaluate it. The specific model of control raises the question about solutions enacted by the legislator. Considerations in this particular research area are important because of reported irregularities in the current model. First, issues of competition and consumer protection should be taken under consideration.
The second part of the analysis requires presentation of proceedings concerning the control of the decision of the President of UOKiK. The analysis of the model is intended to evaluate it, especially in the context of creating a guarantee of effective protection of entrepreneurs' rights.
The specific nature of competition and consumer cases and the nature of the control exercised by the administrative courts lead to the conclusion that the accepted pattern of judicial review of the decision of the President of UOKiK guarantees the effective protection of entrepreneurs' rights. 16, 1993 . It is accurately pointed out in given literature on the subject that differentiation between anti-monopoly and unfair competition matters should be based on the object of protection, which -in the former case are practices impeding free competition, while in the latter -harmful to the fairness of competition. In the case of an unfair competition act, an entrepreneur whose interest has been threatened or harmed may initiate civil proceedings in a common court (other than SOKiK), lodging claims envisaged in the act […] It is a civil law case (as regards the substance) initiated with a view to protect the personal interest of an entrepreneur, unlike an anti-monopoly case initiated by administration body out of concern for public interest" (Stefańska 2013: 849-850 ).
Nature of a competition and consumer protection case
However, these norms are a kind of legal instrument regulating the market, resulting in restrictions being imposed on freedom of economic activity, hence it is concurrently a form of state's interference in private law area. Generally speaking, it should be stated that competition and consumer protection cases include disputes between entrepreneurs and public administration body as to legibility and lawfulness of the above-mentioned restrictions. In view of the above, it is presumed in the doctrine that: "Cases falling under jurisdiction of common courts pursuant to the CCPA, by their nature, have a public law character; however, out of the legislator's will, have been included in the category of civil cases sensu largo. Therefore, formally speaking, they are civil law cases" (Stefańska 2013: 848) . Similar view is presented by representatives of the doctrine of administrative procedural law. Some valuable conclusions -from the point of view of the analysed aspect -can be found in the discussion on the notion of administration court case. "An administration court case, due to referral for examination under civil law procedure, does not change its substantive nature and remains a case concerning review of one form of operation of public administration. As a result, common (civil) court -empowered to interfere in the contents of the relevant act or action undertaken by the administration body concerned -directly affects the rights or obligations of the citizens (natural persons and organisational units) within the area of statutory powers of administration bodies. This is clearly visible, for instance, in art. 479 31a clause 3 of the CCP, empowering SOKiK to amend in whole or in part the decision of the President of UOKiK appealed against and to issue in this respect a judgement on the merits of the case, although an anti-monopoly case is an administration court case and falls within the competence of the President of UOKiK" (Drachal et al. 2013: 36-38) . With respect to liaisons between common courts and supervisions over actions of administration bodies, the authors of the quoted comments […] given the assumed division, the following provisions should be mentioned here:
[…] Article 81 of the competition and Consumer Protection Act and Articles 479 28 -479 35 of the CCP" (Drachal et al. 2013: 39) . According to the above-quoted view, competition and consumer protection cases can be considered as falling within the scope of substantive administrative law.
So, they are civil law cases only formally: resolved under civil law procedure by virtue of specific provisions. Therefore, it is the formal civil character of the cases that caused their exclusion from the jurisdiction of administrative courts.
Moreover, attention should be paid to another aspect causing some dissenting views, both in judicature and the doctrine. There are doubts concerning admissibility of administrative court proceedings in matters concerning complaints on inactivity of regulators or lengthiness or the proceedings conducted by regulators (Drachal et al. 2013: 39) . UOKiK and, subsequently, before common court, are subject to so called hybrid (complex) procedure" (Kmieciak 2002: 33) . The specificity of competition protection proceedings manifests itself in its hybrid nature -both before the President of UOKiK and in the course of review of its decisions and rulings. As it is highlighted in the doctrine: "The hybrid nature of competition and consumer protection proceedings manifests itself also on subsequent level, namely before the court. Here, by virtue of statutory provisions, the review -not only as to legality but also merits of the case -is performed by common court. Hence, this is the stage where an obvious departure from the principle under which administrative rulings are reviewed by administrative courts takes place -the proceedings are conducted before common court and the provisions of CCP concerning business matters apply. A prerequisite for initiation of the proceedings is the exhaustion of the administrative procedure before the President of UOKiK. This is the so called temporary inadmissibility of court proceedings. Proceedings before SOKiK can be initiated only after exhaustion of the procedure before administrative body -in this case before the President of UOKiK" (Jasińska 2013: 164) . In the discussion on competition protection matters, scholars dealing with civil procedural law also highlight this issue. "Administrative proceedings before the President of UOKiK preceding the court proceedings reflects -on the one hand -the complex (related both to civil and public law) character of the examined cases and -on the other hand -it leads to the conclusion that court proceedings should not be inquisitional and that the material stems from the need to ensure the higher level of judicial protections of entrepreneurs' rights […]" (Stefańska 2011: 606-607) . When describing the model of two-stage procedure -combining administrative and civil procedure in anti-monopoly cases, the proposed changes were criticised.
As accurately noticed: "Despite material differences it does not seem justified -already as de lege ferenda proposal -the transfer of power to refer anti-monopoly cases to administrative courts, even if such postulates are formulated by civil procedural law specialists. The controlling power exercised by administrative court is equivalent to that of common court. Each of the courts plays a different role, has different tasks, and -most importantly -the outcomes of review are not fully equivalent. There is a clear difference concerning the last area mentioned above, resulting from the character of the competence of administrative court, aimed at the annulment of a decision or ruling
[…] the court decides on the legality of the contested act. If the contested act is deemed illegal, the court can either repeal it or declare its invalidity or illegality.
[…] Furthermore, administrative court is authorised only to examine the legal aspect on the basis of factual and legal situation stated by the administrative authority. Hence, it is authorised to determine in its adjudication the legality or illegality of the action concerned. With respect to its powers, the court has no grounds to examine the purposefulness of the resolution of the case by administrative body. However, in the case of common courts executing supervision over public administration, the very supervision is the key objective, because the aim is to make a decision concerning the claim of the party and -ultimately -resolution of the case […] Hence, it is hard to accept the opinion that anti-monopoly cases should be transferred to administrative courts, especially since the decisions of the President of UOKiK, in course of further procedures, could not only be repealed, but also modified. Furthermore, the subject-matter of an anti-monopoly case is to decide on the rights and obligations of an entrepreneur not so much vis-à-vis the state, but other market participants (other entrepreneurs or consumers)" (Błaszczak 2014 (Błaszczak : 1347 (Błaszczak -1348 . A different view is presented by K. Jasińska who writes: "[…] competition protection proceedings conducted before an administrative body and, subsequently, before a common court, is not meant to ensure individual protection with respect to specific obligation relations but is in fact aimed at protecting the public interest. Therefore, it seems worthwhile to think whether civil law solutions applied to public law cases of that kind are appropriate means ensuring their realisation and protection" (Jasińska 2013: 167-168) .
Several arguments are used in discussions between the supporters and opponents of submitting competition protection cases to supervision of administrative courts. Particular attention is paid to the power of annulment vested in administrative courts. Opponents of the idea to transfer upon administrative courts the supervision over competition protection cases first of all highlight the weakness of the model. Repealing a decision of the President of UOKiK by court could significantly lengthen the whole procedure of resolving competition protection matters. It seems reasonable to agree with the view that: "In particular, the fact that administrative courts would be vested, in fact, almost exclusively with repealing and annulling powers, would significantly lengthen the period needed to reach the final and binding decision, due to the necessity to repeal the decision whenever an infringement of substantive law and frequently also of procedural law is discovered. In the case of common courts, authorised to amend the decision appealed against, this problem is considerably smaller" (Stefańska 2011: 615 ). Yet, the major argument against referral of competition protections cases to administrative courts is that administrative courts in Poland are the courts of law and not of facts. This manifests itself mainly in the fact that the control over the activity of public administration -or, in other words, the assessment concerning the compliance of the action of the controlled administrative body with the law in force -excludes other aspects, such as purposefulness or economic reasonableness. While the purpose of judicial control exercised by common courts is to implement and apply in practice the substantive law regulations and not a mere legality control of certain administrative acts. The fact that administrative courts do not decide on rights and obligations of parties to the proceedings may raise justified doubts as to whether these courts actually satisfy the criterion of full judicial jurisdiction. As a remedy, both legal scholars and the judicature propose solutions concerning the extension of the scope of administrative courts' adjudicative powers, first of all by vesting them with the power to amend . We must add also that that exercising of anti-monopoly policy by judicial power and not -as intended by the legislator -by professional and specialised executive power body is also criticised in the professional literature.
Concluding remarks
Undoubtedly, the model of control exercised by administrative courts and by common courts considerably differ from each other -the main difference stems from their organisation and division into instances. The assessment of the adopted model of judicial review of decisions of the President of UOKiK seems very complex, especially since both supporters and opponents of the discussed model present reasonable view-points. Yet, it seems beyond argument that " […] adoption of both models of control over administration is justified by the need to ensure thorough and exhaustive protection of rights. Therefore, by vesting the power to control the actions of administration in common courts the legislator decided that due to solutions characteristic for civil procedure, in this way it would ensure optimum protection of certain subjective rights" (Jasińska 2013: 169) . Undoubtedly, referring the examination of competition protection cases to administrative courts would create new problems, for instances connected with the scope of control. The practice has shown so far that review proceedings before common courts may be an effective mechanism for controlling administrative decisions, taking into account other criteria than a mere legality.
